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2.1   Identifying 50 years of social progress 
Poverty alleviation is certainly the most emblematic of European Union ambitions 
in the field of social policy – encompassing in a visible and politically salient way 
the cumulative end effect of many separate interventions in social and economic 
policy. The question posed in this paper is, therefore: Does the past play a role in 
the 50+ poverty we see today? 
This investigation will proceed in three steps: First, poverty in the two waves of 
SHARE will be used as the starting point of the analysis. Poverty alleviation is a 
key motivation for social policy; in a way poverty in our group of 50+ should por-
tray the accumulation of public policies over the life histories of the persons con-
cerned. Old age protection is the most venerable of the objectives of the Welfare 
State in Europe; the amelioration of the effects of social and economic shocks so 
that they have no long term effects is a key objective of social policy. Second, a 
picture of relative deprivation at age 10 is collated from SHARELIFE information 
and an idea gleaned of its link with poverty status in later life. Childhood poverty 
is a key objective of anti-poverty policy and is addressed especially in European 
social policy statements. At the same time, there is a large and inconclusive litera-
ture on the intergenerational transmission of inequality (Champernowne and Cow-
ell, 1998; OECD 2008). The analysis is designed to give the initial conditions of 
the poverty inequality. Third, an attempt is to approach processes of transition 
from the initial conditions to the observed old age poverty. Factors influencing 
this could be due to decisions of the individual, such as education, choice of occu-
pation or family arrangement, patterns of savings; they could be due to unforeseen 
events or shocks: an illness, family breakup, unemployment, migration; they can 
finally be due to public interventions in the form of income transfers, both while 
working and in retirement. Particular attention needs to be paid to key features of 
the type of social policy of relevance to our cohorts and in operation at the mid-
point of our sample’s lives: the size of the Welfare State, the emphasis it placed on 
family, labour and social inclusion and the extent of means testing in operation. 
Expenditure on pensions and most health care expenditure, directed as they were 
at the previous cohorts, should be excluded from the picture. 
Has globalization led to more poverty? Has the intervention of the Welfare 
State prevented the emergence of poverty? Have the funds disbursed in the form 
of social programs bought greater equality, and where? Do our detailed data sup-2  
port Sapir’s (2005) observation that  in  some countries social expenditure does 
worse both in terms of economic efficiency and equity? Our investigation is moti-
vated by these large questions; it is our hope that some light may be shed on them. 
2.2   What is to be explained? Poverty 2004-2007 
In European discussions the concept of poverty, albeit with many reminders of its 
multidimensional nature, has taken centre stage in the attempt to shift emphasis 
away from discussing efforts at social policy (e.g. by comparing expenditures) and 
towards  outcomes  and  effectiveness.  In  political  discourse  the  risk  of  poverty 
stands in as the politically most sensitive indicator, a litmus test of efficacy of the 
‘European Social Model’, as well as  a test case of the negative effects of global-
ization. The use of the concept may also be sanctioned by the observation that 
many social scientists stress the existence of cycles of deprivation, which reinforce 
and make permanent the effects of deprivation. The starting point of the analysis 
thus is the state of poverty as portrayed in the two waves of SHARE.  
The issues raised are discussed in two papers (Lyberaki & Tinios, 2005, 2008), 
so need not be repeated at length: Comparisons are based on net equivalent house-
hold income, while the poverty line is corrected for age effects using information 
about the relative poverty rates for the 50+ population as they are computed using 
the  Survey  of  Income  and  Living  Conditions  (EU-SILC).  (See  Christelis  et  al 
2009 on how these variables are defined and how they relate to other features, 
such as wealth and indebtedness). However, as poverty analysis focuses on the 
bottom part of the income distribution – on what are by definition extreme obser-
vations – it is most likely to be affected by data cleaning, imputations and other 
technical interventions. The numbers presented in Figure 1, using the imputations 
from wave 1 and 2 of the SHARE, though generally higher are not unlike what is 
familiar from other sources such as EU-SILC (Eurostat 2009). 
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Using information from both previous waves one can construct a new definition of 
poverty, depending on whether a particular individual in the longitudinal sample is 
classified under the poverty line in both years, in one year only or in none. This 
measure of ‘persistent poverty’ may be interpreted as capturing permanence in 
poverty (OECD 2008, chapter 6). Alternatively, given that SHARE’s wave 1 col-
lected gross income (corrected for taxes and social insurance contributions in the 
poverty analysis) and wave 2 focused on net income, the analysis may be given an 
errors-in-variables interpretation as capturing more closely ‘true’ poverty or the 
‘hard core’ of poverty (the population of the poor is mostly below the income tax 
threshold, so the gross/net distinction would apply to social insurance only). How-
ever it may be, Figure 2 shows that there is considerable movement around the 
poverty threshold for the longitudinal sample. 
Persistent poverty is experienced by between 6% (SE) and 14% (GR) of the 
sample, while a considerably larger proportion (between 21% in SE and 37% in 
ES) runs the risk of being classed as poor at least once in the two waves. In gen-
eral, the South experiences higher rates of both poverty and persistent poverty, 
though the differences are far less pronounced than is familiar from other surveys 
(e.g. the EU’s SILC survey -see Eurostat, 2009, Statistics in Focus). In most coun-
tries there are more people moving into than moving out of poverty. It is notewor-
thy that the increase is largest in Spain, where the collapse of housing prices af-
fected imputed housing income for poor owner-occupiers. 
 
Figure 2.2:   Poverty and persistent poverty in the longitudinal sample (60% median  
  poverty line) 4  
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Figure 2.3:   Per cent of persistent poor who make ends meet 'with great difficulty' 








































SE DK DE NL BE FR CH AT IT ES GR
both waves wave 1 wave 2 neither
 
 
What is the subjective significance of poverty, measured as it is conventionally as 
a property of the shape of the bottom part of income distribution? A note of cau-
tion is sounded by the unexpectedly low percentage of persistent poor who state 
that they can only make ends meet ‘with great difficulty’ (Figure 3). Thus only 
6.6% of the persistent poor in SE could not make ends meet in both years, while 
fully 83% did not mention ‘great difficulty’ at all. Conversely, the far higher per-
centages in the South confirm that poverty is, subjectively, more pervasive and 
less easily bearable phenomenon than in the North. In GR and IT in each year 5 
50% of that year’s poor state they make ends meet with difficulty. Such an obser-
vation could be explained by greater stoicism in the North, while it could also be 
due to benefits in kind making the consequences of a risk of income poverty less 
important and with fewer consequences for the individuals affected.   
The ‘making ends meet’ question as a kind of subjective evaluation of poverty 
is investigated in detail by Litwin and Sapir (2009) using SHARE wave 1 data. In-
terestingly, they find that income systematically under-predicts subjective poverty 
among the very aged, and may even become insignificant for the oldest old. This 
serves as a reminder that the lived experience of poverty in old age may mean 
very different things in different countries. 
2.3  Initial conditions: Childhood deprivation in the SHARE 
  sample 
How far is the poverty we now observe among the older population simply the re-
flection of inherited deprivation? How far is poverty today conditioned by initial 
conditions during the childhood of our sample? 
SHARELIFE has a number of questions on which a picture of deprivation at 
age 10 can be built up. Eleven events that serve as indicators of childhood depri-
vation were selected: (i) Fixed bath in accommodation at the age of 10, (ii) Cold 
running water supply, (iii) Hot running water supply, (iv) Inside toilet, (v) Central 
heating,  (vi)  None  or  very  few  (0-10  books)  in  accommodation,  (vii)  Over-
crowded accommodation (three or persons per room), (viii) Experienced financial 
hardship during childhood, (ix) Experienced hunger during childhood, (x) Poor 
health status during childhood and (xi) A class of origin indicator (breadwinner of 
the household working as a farmer or in elementary occupation). 
Each of these indicators measures absolute deprivation – in the sense of apply-
ing  a  uniform  deprivation  criterion  across  all  countries  and  cohorts.  What  our 
analysis requires, however, is an idea of relative deprivation (or its opposite, i.e. 
relative well-being); an impression thus needs to be built up of how each individ-
ual stood as compared to what was the norm around him/her. We have thus used 
Tsakloglou and Papadopoulos (2001) each person’s categorical ‘welfare indica-
tor’,  which  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  the  deprivation  indicators  built  from  the 
eleven variables above, weighted by the respective country’s proportion being not 
deprived in the specific indicator (details are available by the authors on request). 
For each country, the estimated childhood relative well-being index takes for each 
person values between 0 (complete deprivation) and 1 (no deprivation). In other 
words,  a  higher  value  implies  less  relative  childhood  deprivation  (more  well-
being) for a citizen of a country. In essence, this approach assumes that being de-
prived during childhood of one event, matters more if that event was more wide-
spread, and hence is more likely to be thought to be part of the ‘social norm’. (To 
ensure adequate degrees of freedom, the analysis was conducted by country, and 6  
not by cohort, as logic  would imply).  Assigning a  ‘deprivation  value’ to each 
event depending on its distance from the social norm, has also been employed in 
other poverty studies (Delhausse, Luttgens and Perelman, 1993). 
The results appear in Figure 4. The current persistent poor enjoyed considera-
bly lower relative well-being than those who are not persistently poor. The differ-
ence is largest in the Nordic countries and smaller for the South and is always sig-
nificant except for the Czech Republic. 
How closely does childhood deprivation correlate with poverty in 2004-2007? 
Figures 4 and 5 examine the incidence of poverty among the childhood deprived 
and vice versa. For the purposes of these analyses (and in the absence of wave 1 
data), those ‘poor’ in wave 2 in PL and CZ are deemed as ‘persistent poor’. 
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Figure 5 examines the opposite question. How did those who started off with a 
disadvantage (interpreted as being in the worse-off 20% in their country) fare in 
their lives? Being deprived at childhood always translates into greater probability 
of being poor and/or persistent poor –with the notable exception once more of the 
Czech Republic. 
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  Note: “d” means childhood deprived; “nd” means not deprived in childhood 
 
The impression one gleans from this brief tour of childhood deprivation and con-
temporary poverty is of a strong link between childhood and later life. The cumu-
lative lack of luck to end at the bottom of the income distribution close to the end 
of one’s life is not automatic, but is subject to variation. These variations may be 
due to own decisions or to chance accidents. All these effects may be mediated by 
societal structures, primarily of those of social protection. It is to these factors we 
now turn. 
2.4   Transitions to poverty – a poverty probit 
Contemporary poverty after age 50 is the cumulative result of decisions and events 
during the lifetime of the person. Seen in this light it is hardly surprising that no 
single  link  or  relationship  is  immediately  evident  in  a  preliminary  naked-eye 
analysis. The effects are likely to be complex and will be mediated through other 
decisions and through social structures which themselves changed over time. This 
means that (a) a multidimensional analysis is appropriate in picking up marginal 
effects and (b) if the focus is on social policy a careful model of Welfare State pa-
rameters is essential. 
This section proceeds to a probit analysis explaining persistent poverty. A pro-
bit may be seen as a partial initial response to the first requirement and possibly 
could provide a start on the second.  
The dependent variable is contemporary persistent poverty (1 if poor, 0 if not). 
The explanatory variables are divided into 5 categories: 8  
1. Demographics: We distinguish three age cohorts 50-65, 65-80 and 80+. Gen-
der, marital status (widow) and foreign-born. 
2. Childhood relative well being index in continuous form (0=maximum depriva-
tion). 
3. Life time experiences: number of children, Inheritance (>5000 euro), temporary 
leave of absence for one year or more due to ill-health or disability. 
4. Effects of Socio-economic decisions: Never in paid work, Type of paid work 
(elementary-blue  collar,  professional-clerk),  Education,  Retirement  history 
(Employed, retired in past 5 years, in the past 6-20 years, more than 20 ago). 
5. Characteristics of the Welfare State in the middle-life (decade of their 40s) of 
the  respondent.  Three  linked  indicators  are  included,  drawing  from  the 
ESSPROS dataset: (a) overall size as measured by social protection as % of 
GDP, which includes matters such as education only if they are targeted on in-
come (e.g. scholarships to poor pupils), (b) Per cent of total social protection 
expenditure accounted by family, unemployment, housing and social exclusion 
function (i.e. not pensions or health) and (c) Per cent of total social protection 
expenditure accounted for by means-tested benefits. Given that all these vari-
ables were subject to different interpretations in transition countries, a transi-
tion dummy is also included. 
Most of the variables have the expected signs and can provide a plausible account 
of how initial deprivation may translate to current poverty: The age dummies must 
be seen in conjunction with the years from retirement variable; being still in em-
ployment counteracts a positive effect of being in the younger cohort. Being a 
widow and being foreign-born exert important influences, as is having had many 
children or having to have quit a job due to injury. White collar occupations and 
education predictably play an important role in preventing current poverty.  
The  childhood  well-being  index  in  all  cases  plays  an  important  and  well-
defined role, in the sense that its marginal effect appears to depend very little on 
specification. An interesting observation is that its value alters very little once 
country dummies and other country specific information is present; this may be 
taken as evidence that the way original deprivation impinges on current poverty is 
fairly uniform across countries. If this is so, then it would follow that the type of 
individual who is most likely to develop from childhood relative to late life pov-
erty is relatively invariant between countries, an important observation in itself. 
Turning to the Welfare State characteristics, the emerging picture is very inter-
esting. The proportion of social expenditure spent on matters that affect people of 
working age (maternity, housing, unemployment) always reduces the probability 
of being persistent poor in later life, as does the extent of means testing. Well-
targeted social expenditure in the mid-life of our respondents continues to pay 
dividends in later life.  The weakly significant positive effect of total expenditure 
may also have an appealing interpretation: High values for this variable signal 
large expenditure on old age protection and health. Our respondents at this stage in 
their lives were mostly working and healthy; for them high pension expenditure 9 
would be associated with greater taxes rather than higher benefits. We may inter-
pret this effect as a kind of crowding-out of one kind of social welfare by another. 
The positive sign of this  variable is dependent on the presence of a transition 
country dummy. Excluding transition countries from the estimation reinforces the 
welfare state effects noted.  
 
Table 2.1:  Determinants of Persistent Poverty status: Probit results  
Dependent variable = Persistent Poor 2004/2007  Marginal effect Std error
Demographics 
Age: 50-64 years  0.0645** 0.0100
Age: 65-80 years  F
Age: over 80 years  -0.0143 0.0114
Female  -0.0115 0.0075
Widowed  0.0417** 0.0115
Foreign-born  0.0613** 0.0186
Childhood deprivation index     
Childhood non-deprivation index: for each country 
ranges from 0 (complete deprivation) to 1 no depriva-
tion   -0.0885** 0.0234
Life-time experiences     
Number of children  0.0112** 0.0022
Received inheritance (>5000 euros)  -0.0031 0.0111
Temporary leave of absence from a job for one year 
 or more because of ill health / disability  0.0279* 0.0100
Socio-economic characteristics     
Never in paid work  F  
Paid work: Elementary / Blue-collar  -0.0097 0.0112
Paid work: Professional / Clerk  -0.0372** 0.0117
     
Primary education or lower   F  
Secondary education  -0.0611** 0.0079
Higher education  -0.0731** 0.0084
     
Other employment status  F  
In employment  -0.0736** 0.0074
Retired in past 5 years  -0.0463** 0.0113
Retired in past 6-20 years  -0.0578** 0.0085
Retired in more than 20 years ago  -0.0404** 0.0091
 10  
Social protection expenditure as (%) of GDP in  
middle-life of the respondent  0.0024* 0.0012
Other social benefits expenditure (except for  
pensions and health-related benefits)  as (%) of  
social protection expenditure in middle-life of  
the respondent  -0.0015** 0.0006
Means-tested benefits as (%) of social protection  
expenditure in middle-life of the respondent  -0.0029** 0.0010
Transition countries (CZ; PL; GDR)  0.1239** 0.0169
Pseudo R-square  0.116
Number of observations  17478
Source: SHARE Wave 1, Wave 2 release 2.3.0; Wave 3, release 0 
**, *: Significant at 1%, 5% respectively. 
 
Once country group dummies (roughly corresponding to Esping-Andersen’s 1990 
groups)  are  added,  the  influence  of  family  and  other  social  policies  increases, 
means testing becomes insignificant and total social protection expenditure virtu-
ally disappears.   Once dummies are included for all countries all Welfare State 
variables become insignificant, though they retain the original signs. 
Thus, welfare policies matter, as does the extent of targeting adopted. However, 
with minor exceptions, the influence of social policy is benign in a generalized 
way, affecting the probability of being persistent poor across the board. We have 
uncovered –at this level of generality at least– little evidence of social policy in-
teracting with specific features of individual lives such as employment or family 
choices. In particular, the influence of initial conditions is in all cases very strong 
and it is little altered by adding information on social policy or allowing for spe-
cific national effects. 
How  strong  is  the  social  policy  effect?  To  illustrate  the  answer  our  probit 
model gives, at first a baseline high-poverty group was selected and its expected 
probability of being current persistent poor was computed. Widows, with elemen-
tary education, and facing maximum deprivation in childhood, if social policy is at 
mean levels for the whole sample face a probability of 28.9%. If, however, they 
lived in a hypothetical country with Germany’s targeting and Denmark’s family 
policy, the same group  would face a probability of 23.5%, a reduction of 5.4 
points or of 18.8%. Conversely, if they were unlucky enough to face Greece’s 
means testing, Italy’s family expenditure, and without corresponding reduction in 
old-age spending (Italy’s total expenditure), the predicted probability would rise to 
32.2%, a 3.3 points rise or 11.6 relative to the benchmark. The range from the 
worst social policy case to the best one is from 23.5% to 32.24, fully 8.7 percent-
age points, close to the overall mean.  Table 2 shows these and other combinations 
of social policy stances. 
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Table 2.2:  The predicted effect of social policy in the probit model, relative to a  
  deprived benchmark 






(%) vis-à-vis the 
benchmark
Benchmark:  Deprived individual + At the means of  
social policy parameters (SHARE countries)  28.90  ..
Germany's means tested social policy; Denmark's  
non-pensions and health-related social policy  23.47  -18.8%
Average means tests Denmark's family social policy  24.66  -14.7%
Germany's means tests; Average family social policy  27.60  -4.5%
Greece's means tests; Italy's family social policy  31.91  10.4%
Greece's means tests; Italy's family social policy;  
Italy's total social expenditure  32.24  11.6%
Notes: Baseline population group (Widowed, with elementary education, non-professional 
occupation, relative deprived in childhood).  
 
The effect of original deprivation was gauged relative to the same benchmark by 
simulating the effect of moving the deprivation index from its minimum (in the 
baseline) to the median value of the deprivation index for all countries. The base-
line probability drops drastically from 28.9% to 21.4%, a reduction of 7.5 points, a 
little less than the range due to social policy. 
2.5   Conclusion: A ‘European Social Model’?  
The results of this paper appear to affirm that ‘social policy pays’. Not only con-
temporaneously as a palliative of immediate problems, but also as a long-term in-
vestment. Our results indicate that, once original deprivation is taken into account, 
targeted public expenditure on family, housing, labour and social exclusion con-
tinues to pay dividends decades later – when the beneficiaries have reached re-
tirement age and onwards.   
This paper began by asking a number of questions about the effects and effi-
cacy of social policy. Those who think of Social expenditure as ‘a factor of pro-
duction’, may find some corroboration for their position; the reach and effective-
ness of this factor, though, was by no means uniform. The search for the European 
social model can go on. 12  
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